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TRIPARTITE STRUCTURES OF CRIMINAL LAW




In The Grammar of Criminal Law, George Fletcher distinguishes
between four ways of analyzing the internal structure of criminal
offenses. These are the bipartite, tripartite, quadripartite, and holistic
modes of analysis.' The bipartite structure is generally used in common
law countries and the tripartite structure is generally used in civil law
countries, particularly Germany. The tripartite structure, which Fletcher
declares is "the foundation" for his book,2 will be the principal focus of
this Article. The claim that the tripartite structure is preferable will be
assessed by comparing it to what Fletcher terms "the simplest-but also
the least accurate-system," 3 the bipartite structure.
This Article assesses the claimed superiority of the tripartite
structure by focusing on its difficulties in determining the appropriate
conceptual place for analyzing mens rea or subjective elements of
intention and negligence. Varying versions of the tripartite structure
locate these subjective or mens rea elements either within the first stage
(definition of the offense), the third stage (culpability), or by splitting
mens rea between the first and third stages. Two possible
interpretations will be considered and found unsatisfactory. First, all
three versions are correct and preferable to the bipartite structure. This
interpretation is problematic by generating a contradiction that an
actor's conduct is simultaneously a greater degree of wrongdoing, the
same level of wrongdoing, and a lesser degree of wrongdoing than
* Associate Professor of Law, The University of Tulsa College of Law. I am indebted to Kai
Ambos, Luis Chiesa, Markus Dubber, Kimberley Kessler Ferzan, John Gardner, and Shlomit
Wallerstein for their helpful comments and criticisms.
I GEORGE P. FLETCHER, THE GRAMMAR OF CRIMINAL LAW: AMERICAN, COMPARATIVE,
INTERNATIONAL (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 66, on file with the Cardozo Law Review)
[hereinafter GRAMMAR MANUSCRIPT]. For a discussion of the quadripartite structure, see id. at
72-75; for a discussion of the holistic mode of analysis, see id. at 85-89.
2 GRAMMAR MANUSCRIPT, supra note 1, at 66.
3 Id.
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another actor's conduct. Second, one of the versions of the tripartite
structure is correct and preferable to the bipartite structure. This
interpretation is also problematic because placing mens rea, either
completely or partially, in the first, or definition, stage improperly
analyzes cases of faultless aggression. And by placing mens rea in the
third stage-culpability-the resulting minimalist definition of the
elements of attempt offenses fails to reflect a morally coherent norm.
Thus, each version of the tripartite structure is problematic. As a result,
neither of the two interpretations as to the differing versions of the
tripartite structure are tenable. The difficulties in analyzing mens rea
render the claimed superiority of the tripartite structure unclear.
I. TRIPARTITE AND BIPARTITE STRUCTURES OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
The two dimensions of the bipartite system Fletcher identifies are
the actus reus and the mens rea. The actus reus represents the "external
side of criminal conduct" and the mens rea reflects the "internal side" of
criminal conduct. 4  Fletcher declares that the concurrence
requirement-the actus reus and mens rea temporally coinciding-is the
structure's "basic maxim."'5 The "one major drawback" of the bipartite
structure, according to Fletcher, is that it "fails to account for the entire
range of defenses that are grouped under the categories of justification
and excuse."'6 Despite this, "for good or ill," the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court incorporates the bipartite structure. 7
The three dimensions, or stages, of the tripartite structure are
definition, wrongdoing, and culpability. Each of these three inculpatory
dimensions corresponds with an exculpatory dimension that can negate
the inculpatory dimension. Unlike the bipartite system in which one
might consider the actus reus either before or after the mens rea, the
ordering of the stages is "critical." 8 Thus, the inculpatory dimension of
the first stage of definition of the offense includes, according to
Fletcher, the elements of human action, norm violation, causation, and
harm.9  The negation of any of these elements establishes the
defendant's lack of criminal liability. If, however, the defendant's
conduct satisfies all the elements of the first stage and none of these
elements is negated, the defendant's conduct is presumed to satisfy the
second stage of wrongfulness. This presumption of wrongfulness can
4 Id. at 67.
5 Id.
6 Id. at 69.
7 Id at 71.
8 Id. at 79.
9 Id. at 78.
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be negated by a justification. The inapplicability of ajustification leads
to a presumption that the defendant satisfies the third stage of guilt,
culpability, accountability, or responsibility. This presumption can be
negated by an excuse. The inapplicability of an excuse, however, leads
to a determination of the defendant's criminal liability.
Perhaps the most significant controversy within the tripartite
structure has been whether mens rea or the subjective elements of, for
example, intention and negligence, belong in the first stage as part of
the definition of the offense or in the third stage as part of culpability or
blameworthiness.10 Various accounts of the tripartite structure place it
within the first stage and others place it within the third stage. Another
possibility is that mens rea is neither entirely in the first nor third stage.
The factual, descriptive component of mens rea might be in the first
stage11 and the evaluative, normative component might be in the third
stage. 12
Most scholars seem to place it within the first stage; the definition
of the offense. Wolfgang Naucke defines the definition of the offense
as "embrac[ing] all of the elements of a particular crime" which
presumably include the element of mens rea.1 3  Markus Dubber
similarly defines the inculpatory dimension of the first stage as
"satisfaction of all offense elements as defined in the statute." 14 Dubber
10 Id. at 81; George P. Fletcher, Criminal Theory in the Twentieth Century, 2 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 265, 272-73 (2001) [hereinafter Fletcher, Criminal Theory].
I I Under the descriptive theory, "mens rea refers simply to a state of consciousness, or to
acting with a particular end in mind." Fletcher, Criminal Theory, supra note 10, at 274. Fletcher
further explains that "[o]n the descriptive interpretation of mens rea, however, it is entirely
possible that one might act with culpability (i.e., intention or knowledge) and yet be justified or
excused." Id.
12 As Fletcher explains:
All the terms referring to mens rea (culpability, blameworthiness, guilty mind, criminal
intent, etc.) lend themselves either to a normative or to a descriptive interpretation.
The normative holds that these terms are condemnatory and conclusive, in principle, on
liability. The notion of culpability or mens rea must be interpreted, therefore, to be
inconsistent with the presence of a justification or excuse. If someone acts properly in
necessity or self-defense or is excused on grounds of duress or insanity, it cannot be the
case, on the normative theory, that he or she is culpable.
Id. at 273-74. As a result, under a normative theory, mens rea must be within the third stage.
This is because a normative theory of culpability within the first stage would render the second
and third stages superfluous. If a defendant was deemed normatively culpable, then that
defendant cannot be justified or excused and there would be no need to go to the second and third
stages. Similarly, if a defendant was deemed to be not normatively culpable, then the defendant
could not be crimipally liable and again there would be no need to consider the second and third
stages. As a result, ifa normative theory of culpability was employed in the first stage, regardless
of whether the defendant was deemed normatively culpable or not, consideration of the second
and third stages would be superfluous. To avoid rendering the second and third stages
superfluous, a normative theory of culpability must not be a part of the first stage. It must be
within the third stage.
13 Wolfgang Naucke, An Insider's Perspective on the Significance of the German Criminal
Theory's General System for Analyzing Criminal Acts, 1984 BYU L. REV. 305, 312.
14 Markus Dirk Dubber, Theories of Crime and Punishment in German Criminal Law, 53
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further explains that this first stage "begins by determining whether the
defendant's conduct matches the definition of a criminal offense-say,
because she has intentionally caused the death of another human being,
thus satisfying the definition of murder."' 5  Stefan Trechsel includes
intention within the first stage of definition of the offense as one of the
"specific aspects of 'definition. '"l6  Albin Eser, one of the leading
German criminal law scholars, includes intention, negligence, and other
subjective elements such as purpose or motive in the first stage, the
definition of the offense. 17 Eser notes that the traditional view that
intention was part of the third stage has been largely supplanted by the
more modem view of intention as part of the definition of the offense. 18
Although in The Grammar of Criminal Law Fletcher carefully
avoids explicitly declaring whether mens rea belongs in the first or third
stage, or in both stages, he does assign mens rea to the third stage in a
recent article.' 9  Fletcher defines the third stage of culpability as
including "mens rea, responsibility, blameworthiness etc."' 20 Fletcher
explains that the debate as to the proper classification of mens rea
became an "impassioned confrontation" but now "that debate has run its
course."'2' The debate, however, has apparently not dimmed
commentators' enthusiasm for the tripartite structure. Trechsel declares
that he is "quite convinced ... [that the tripartite] structure is superior in
logic to any other one. This opinion seems to be shared by some
American scholars, e.g., Professor George Fletcher of Columbia
University. '22 But curiously Fletcher's placement of mens rea in the
third stage seems to conflict with other leading scholars of German
criminal law. If the debate has run its course, what explains the
apparent dissensus?
II. ARE ALL THE VERSIONS OF THE TRIPARTITE STRUCTURE CORRECT?
Perhaps this apparent dissensus is irrelevant if all the various
versions of the tripartite structure are correct and preferable to the
bipartite structure. But, as will be demonstrated, if all are correct, a
AM. J. COMP. L. 679, 680 (2005).
15 Id (emphasis added).
16 Stefan Trechsel, Comparative Observations on Human Rights Law and Criminal Law,
2000 ST. LOUIS-WARSAW TRANSATLANTIC L.J. 1, 17.
17 Albin Eser, Justification and Excuse: A Key Issue in the Concept of Crime, in I
JUSTIFICATION AND EXCUSE: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 17, 62 (Albin Eser & George P.
Fletcher eds., 1987).
18 Id. at 65.
19 Fletcher, Criminal Theory, supra note 10, at 275.
20 Id
21 Id. at 272-73.




Consider the following example involving a comparison of the
wrongdoing of two actors-Ava and Upton-who each commit a
homicide under similar circumstances except for differences in their
mens rea. Though Ava's conduct does not constitute a crime, her
conduct satisfies some of the elements of reckless homicide.23 Ava kills
another aware of the risk that her conduct posed a risk. The risk was
substantial and unjustified, but Ava does not run afoul of the reasonable
person standard of recklessness. Ava does satisfy the part of the
definition of the offense of reckless homicide containing the factual,
descriptive component of the mens rea of recklessness-awareness of
the risk. However, she does not satisfy the normative component of the
mens rea of recklessness.
Like Ava, Upton satisfies some (but not all) of the elements of
reckless homicide; unlike Ava, Upton commits the crime of negligent
homicide.24 Upton kills another unaware (though he should have been
aware) that his conduct posed a risk. The risk was substantial,
unjustified, and Upton runs afoul of the reasonable person standard.
Although Upton does not satisfy the descriptive component of the mens
rea of recklessness, he does satisfy both the descriptive and normative
components of the mens rea of negligence.
Let us first compare Ava's and Upton's conduct under the version
of the tripartite structure with mens rea in the first stage. Though Ava
satisfies the descriptive component of the mens rea of recklessness, she
satisfies the normative component of the mens rea of neither
recklessness nor negligence. Thus, Ava fails to satisfy the elements of
the definition of the offense of any crime and her conduct is not
wrongful. Though Upton fails to satisfy the descriptive component of
23 For a definition of recklessness see, for example, the Model Penal Code:
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when he
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustified risk that the material element exists
or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that,
considering the nature and purpose of the actor's conduct and the circumstances known
to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-
abiding person would observe in the actor's situation.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985). For Fletcher's
discussion of the descriptive and normative components of this conception of recklessness, see
GRAMMAR MANUSCRIPT, supra note 1, at 471-77.
24 For a definition of negligence, see, for example, the Model Penal Code:
A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an offense when he
should be aware of a substantial and unjustified risk that the material element exists or
will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the
actor's failure to perceive it, considering the nature and purpose of his conduct and the
circumstances known to him, involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that
a reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d). For Fletcher's discussion of the descriptive and normative
components of this conception of negligence, see FLETCHER, GRAMMAR MANUSCRIPT, supra
note 1, at 471-77.
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the mens rea of recklessness, he does satisfy both the descriptive and
normative components of the mens rea of negligence. Upton thus
satisfies the elements of the definition of the offense of negligent
homicide. Lacking a justification, Upton's conduct is wrongful. As a
result, Upton's wrongdoing of negligent homicide is worse than Ava's
nonexistent wrongdoing.
Next let us analyze their wrongdoing under the version of the
tripartite structure placing mens rea in the third stage. With the issues
of mens rea removed to the third stage, the differences between Ava's
and Upton's mens rea will not affect the analysis of their wrongdoing in
the second stage. As a result, both Ava and Upton commit the same
wrongdoing of some type of homicide. 25
And finally let us analyze their wrongdoing under the version of
the tripartite structure splitting mens rea between the first and third
stages. Under this version, the descriptive component of mens rea is in
the first stage and the normative component is in the third stage. Since
Ava satisfies the descriptive component of the mens rea of recklessness,
Ava's conduct satisfies the first stage-the elements of the definition of
the offense of reckless homicide. Lacking a justification, Ava's conduct
is wrongful; she commits the wrongdoing of reckless homicide. Since
Upton satisfies the descriptive component of the mens rea of negligence
(but not recklessness), Upton's conduct satisfies the first stage-the
elements of the definition of the offense of negligent homicide.
Lacking a justification, Upton's conduct is wrongful; Upton commits
the wrongdoing of negligent homicide. As a result, Ava's wrongdoing
of reckless homicide is worse than Upton's wrongdoing of negligent
homicide.
The three different versions of the tripartite structure supply three
different outcomes of the comparative analysis of Ava's and Upton's
wrongdoings. 26 With mens rea in the first stage, Upton's wrongdoing of
25 Note that the type of homicidal wrongdoing-murder, reckless homicide, negligent
homicide, etc., cannot be specified because with mens rea in the third stage, mens rea does not
contribute to or determine the wrongdoing.
26 One might argue that comparisons of what wrongdoing is worse than other wrongdoing are
inapt. Only whether or not actors are criminally liable provides a useful basis for a comparison.
But the concept of wrongfulness, or wrongdoing, is important and does serve as a basis for
making comparisons. Fletcher explains that "[i]t is important to maintain these distinctions
[between the definition, wrongdoing, and culpability stages] for they capture important nuances
in our perception of criminal conduct." GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL
LAW 81 (1998) [hereinafter FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS]. According to Fletcher, wrongfulness
means that the conduct stands "in violation of a rule of law." Id. at 77.
The concept of wrongdoing is related. Id. at 80 ("It will be convenient to use the terms
interchangeably .. "). Wrongdoing entails a "characteristically dangerous and feared way of
doing harm to others." Id. at 78. It means "action invading the protected interests of others." Id.
Either as the violation of a rule, a substantial harm, or an invasion of the interest of another,




negligent homicide is worse than Ava's nonexistent wrongdoing. With
mens rea in the third stage, they both commit the same wrongdoing of
some unspecified form of homicide. With mens rea split between the
first and third stages, Ava's wrongdoing of reckless homicide is worse
than Upton's wrongdoing of negligent homicide.
If all three versions are correct, then the degree of Upton's
wrongdoing is simultaneously more than, the same as, and less than the
degree of Ava's wrongdoing. To avoid this contradiction, the premise
that generated the contradiction must be rejected. As a result, the
premise that all the versions are correct must be rejected. Therefore,
two of these versions of the tripartite structure are incorrect and, at
most, only one of the versions may be correct.
III. Is ONE VERSION OF THE TRIPARTITE STRUCTURE CORRECT AND
PREFERABLE TO THE BIPARTITE STRUCTURE?
At most one version of the tripartite structure may be correct and
preferable to the bipartite structure. This part assesses the three
versions of the tripartite structure by applying them to two issues: (i)
defensive force against faultless aggressors, and (ii) attempts. The
version with mens rea in the first stage will be demonstrated to incur
problems when applied to the faultless aggression issue. The problems
are avoided by placing mens rea in the third stage. The version with
mens rea in the third stage, however, will be demonstrated to incur a
problem when applied to attempts. The problem is avoided by placing
mens rea back into the first stage. Splitting mens rea between the first
and third stages avoids the problems of placing mens rea entirely in the
third stage but incurs the same problems as placing mens rea entirely in
the first stage. As a result, each version of the tripartite structure is
problematic.
A. Defensive Force Against Faultless Aggressors
Consider the issue of whether a victim of an attack by a faultless
aggressor may be justified in using defensive force against the faultless
aggressor. Compare the following attacks by two different types of
faultless aggressors:
Psychotic Aggressor: A psychotic or insane aggressor, PA, shoots at
Moreover, the very concept of wrongdoing is inherently comparative in nature. As
Fletcher explains, "wrongdoing is expressed in degrees. Murder is worse than burglary, which is
worse than larceny .... Id.
2007] 2681
CARDOZO LA W REVIEW
an innocent victim.
Mistaken Aggressor: An aggressor, M4, reasonably and
unavoidably, but mistakenly, believing that an innocent victim is a
tree, shoots at the innocent victim.
Would the innocent victim be justified in using defensive force
against the two aggressors? In order for a victim of aggression to be
eligible to be justified in self-defense against an aggressor, the
aggressor's conduct must be wrongful. The German Criminal Code
provides that "'Self-defense' refers to a defense necessary to ward off
an imminent wrongful attack from oneself or another. '27 Let us then
analyze whether each aggressor's conduct is wrongful under the three
versions of the tripartite structure in order to determine whether the
innocent victim is eligible to be justified in using self-defense against
the aggressors.
1. Mens Rea Within the First Stage-Definition of Offense
Let us first analyze the case of the psychotic aggressor. Under the
version of the tripartite structure placing mens rea in the first stage, the
definition of the offense, PA's conduct presumptively satisfies the
inculpatory dimension of the definition of the offense. PA's insanity
fails to negate any aspect of the definition of the offense. PA's conduct
is thus presumptively wrongful. Lacking a justification to negate the
second stage, or wrongdoing, PA's conduct is wrongful. 28 Since PA's
attack is wrongful, the victim would be eligible to be justified in self-
defense against PA.
Let us next analyze the case of the mistaken aggressor. MA's
conduct presumptively satisfies the inculpatory dimension of the
definition of the offense. But MA4's reasonable and unavoidable mistake
negates the definition of the offense stage. With the definition of the
offense negated, MA's conduct is not wrongful. Since MA's conduct is
not wrongful, the innocent victim is ineligible to be justified in self-
defense. 29
27 Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Penal Code] § 32(2) (1975) (translated by George P. Fletcher, The
Right and the Reasonable, 98 HARV. L. REv. 949, 967 (1985) (emphasis added)).
28 Though wrongful, PA's insanity would negate presumptive satisfaction of the third stage,
the culpability stage, and thus PA would not be criminally liable for the attack.
29 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
2682 [Vol. 28:6
TRIPARTITE STRUCTURES
a. Treating Similar Cases Dissimilarly
Although the version of the tripartite structure analyzing mens rea
in the first stage treats the two cases dissimilarly, are these similar cases
that should be treated similarly? Both aggressors are faultless. Both
victims of aggression are innocent. Both victims of aggression face
attacks from faultless aggressors. So why should the victim of one type
of faultless aggression enjoy a right of self-defense and the other victim
not? Under the version of the tripartite structure analyzing mens rea in
the first stage, the answer is because one victim faces a wrongful attack
and the other faces a non-wrongful attack. PA's attack is wrongful and
the victim is thereby eligible to be justified in self-defense. But MA's
attack is not wrongful and the victim is not eligible to be justified in
self-defense. But if both aggressors are faultless, why is one
aggressor's conduct wrongful and the other aggressor's conduct not
wrongful? Under the version of the tripartite structure analyzing mens
rea in the first stage, the answer is because what makes the psychotic
aggressor's conduct faultless is not analyzed until the third stage,
whereas what makes the mistaken aggressor's conduct faultless is
analyzed in the first stage. But apart from this formal difference, there
does not seem to be a substantive difference in principle that makes one
faultless aggressor's conduct wrongful and the other faultless
aggressor's conduct not wrongful. This version of the tripartite
structure analyzing mens rea in the first stage treats similar cases
dissimilarly.
b. Barring Innocent Victims from Using Justified, Defensive Force
In addition to treating similar cases dissimilarly, this version of the
tripartite structure analyzing mens rea in the first stage bars an innocent
victim from being eligible to justifiably use force in self-defense against
MA. But surely, this is a counter-intuitive and unfortunate result. The
innocent victim should be eligible to be justified in using self-defense
against MA.
Compounding this unfortunate, counter-intuitive result, the
aggressor might even be eligible to justifiably use force in self-defense
against the innocent victim. Suppose the innocent victim intentionally
does use force, in self-protection, against MA. The victim's intentional
use of force satisfies the definitions of some offenses-for example,
battery or attempted murder. Since the victim does not commit a
mistake of fact, there is nothing to negate the victim's satisfaction of the
inculpatory dimension of the definition of the offense. Thus, the
victim's force would be presumptively wrongful. Since the victim
26832007]
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would not qualify for a self-defense justification, the presumption of
wrongfulness would not be negated. The victim's conduct would be
wrongful. And since the victim's force is wrongful, any force MA
might use against the victim would now be eligible to be justifiable self-
defense. As a result, not only is the victim barred from being justified
in using self-defense against MA, but also MA may become justified in
using self-defense against the victim. As applied to the case of the
mistaken aggressor, the version of the tripartite structure analyzing
mens rea in the first stage incorrectly bars the innocent victim from
being, and incorrectly privileges the aggressor to be, justified in self-
defense.
c. Possible Resolutions
This section considers three possible resolutions to the problems
incurred by the version of the tripartite structure analyzing mens rea in
the first stage. First, even if self-defense is unavailable, the defense of
necessity might apply. Second, even if self-defense and necessity are
inapplicable, the distinct defense of "defensive necessity" might apply.
Third, the mistaken aggressor's non-wrongful conduct might arbitrarily
be deemed wrongful for purposes of a victim's claim of self-defense.
i. Necessity
One possible resolution is to allow the victim of mistaken
aggression to use defensive force not under self-defense, but rather
under the defense of necessity.30 Unlike self-defense, the defense of
necessity does not require the defensive force to be used only against a
wrongful threat.31  Thus, the victim's force against MA would be
eligible to be justified under the defense of necessity despite MA not
posing a wrongful threat. In order to qualify for the necessity defense,
the victim's force must protect an interest that "substantially outweighs"
30 1 am indebted to Luis Chiesa for pointing out to me that this approach is the predominant
solution in civil law jurisdictions that place the analysis ofmens rea in the first stage.
31 The German Code provision on the defense of necessity is as follows:
Whoever engages in action in order to thwart an imminent risk, to himself or another,
to Life, Limb, Liberty, Honor, Property or other Legally protected Interest, acts not
wrongfully, provided that in comparing the two conflicting interests, the interest
protected substantially outweighs the interest invaded. This provision applies only so
far as the action is an appropriate means to thwart the risk.
Strafgsesetzbuch [StGB] [Penal Code] § 34, translated in FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS, supra
note 26, at 141.
2684 [Vol. 28:6
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the interest invaded.32 That is, the victim's life must substantially
outweigh M4's life. If so, then the victim has a defense for the force
used against MA. And as a result, placing mens rea in the first stage
would not lead to the inappropriate outcome of the innocent victim
being barred from justified defensive force.
But it is not clear that the victim's life outweighs, let alone
substantially outweighs, MA's life. As Fletcher observes with respect to
another case of faultless aggression-the psychotic aggressor attacking
an innocent, "if it is life against life, it is hard to see why we should say
that it is right and proper for one person to live and the other to die. 33
Fletcher finds "inadequate" the view that "the life of the insane
aggressor is worth less than the life of the defendant standing his
ground. '34  Fletcher concludes that "[t]he better way to solve the
problem of the psychotic aggressor is to recognize that the aggression
against which self-defense is directed must be wrongful but not
necessarily culpable aggression. ' 35 Thus, if the life of an innocent
(victim of aggression by a psychotic) does not outweigh the life of the
psychotic aggressor, then presumably the life of the innocent (victim of
an attack by the faultless, mistaken aggressor) does not outweigh the
life of MA. This is because both MA, the aggressor who makes a
reasonable and unavoidable mistake, and the psychotic aggressor are
faultless. And the victims of their faultless aggression are no less
innocent and faultless.
So, to the extent that the case of the reasonably and unavoidably
mistaken aggressor is analogous to the case of the psychotic aggressor,
the victim should not receive the defense of necessity. The victim's life
does not substantially outweigh MA's life. Thus, the possibility of the
victim receiving a necessity defense does not provide a solution to the
problem incurred by analyzing mens rea in the first stage.
Even if applicable, the necessity defense does not resolve all the
problems for this version of the tripartite structure. That is, suppose
arguendo that the victim's life did substantially outweigh MA's life and
that the victim's defensive force was justified under the necessity
defense. While avoiding the problem of barring the innocent victim
from being justified in the use of defensive force, this resolution fails to
harmonize the similar cases of psychotic and mistaken aggression.
Even under this resolution, the version of the tripartite structure
analyzing mens rea in the first stage still treats similar cases
dissimilarly. Both innocent victims face attacks by faultless aggressors,
but one victim is eligible for the defense of self-defense and the other is
32 Id.
33 FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS, supra note 26, at 143.
34 Id. at 144.
35 Id.
20071 2685
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not. That the victim not eligible for self-defense may be eligible for a
different defense-necessity-fails to address the tripartite structure's
inconsistency.
ii. Defensive Necessity
As discussed above, the traditional defense of necessity requires
that the interest protected substantially outweigh the interest harmed. In
contrast, the distinct defense of defensive necessity is said to be a
defense to conduct that harms an interest not significantly greater than
the interest protected. 36 As a result, it might provide a defense to the
innocent victim of MA's attack. Even if the victim's defensive force
against MA is not protecting a significantly greater interest than it is
harming, the victim's force is protecting an interest not significantly
disproportionate to the interest that it is harming. That is, since the
victim's life is approximately equivalent to MA's life, the defense of
defensive necessity might provide the defense that the innocent victim
deserves, but which is unavailable under the traditional defenses of self-
defense and necessity.
Although a promising basis for a defense of the victim's use of
defensive force against MA, the applicability of the justification defense
of defensive necessity is unclear. Consider Sharon Byrd's formulation
of the defense:
An actor is justified in causing harm to another individual if
1) the harm is necessary to protect the actor or any other party from
imminent danger unjustifiably caused by the individual harmed,
2) the harm caused by the act is not (considerably) greater than the
harm avoided thereby, and
3) the harm avoided was not avoidable through otherwise available
less harmful alternatives. 37
The formulation requires that the danger to the actor be "unjustifiably
caused by the individual harmed." Therefore, in order for the victim to
be eligible for the defense, MA's attack must have been unjustified. But
was MA's attack unjustified? Perhaps not. Since MA's attack was not
wrongful because it failed to satisfy the definition of the offense at the
first stage, the analysis under the tripartite structure terminates. The
second stage-whether conduct is justified or not-only applies with
respect to conduct that satisfies the definition of an offense and is
thereby presumptively wrongful. Thus, under the tripartite structure we
36 1 am grateful to Luis Chiesa for pointing out the possible applicability of this defense.
37 B. Sharon Byrd, Till Death Do Us Part: A Comparative Law Approach to Justifying Lethal
Self-Defense by Battered Women, 1991 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 169, 209-10.
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do not inquire of conduct that fails to satisfy the definition of an offense
whether or not it is justified. As a result, not wrongful conduct is
neither justified nor unjustified. Since MA's attack fails to constitute
the requisite unjustified attack, the innocent victim fails to satisfy
Byrd's formulation of the defense of defensive necessity.
Even if a suitable formulation of the defense of defensive necessity
would apply to the victim's force against MA, other problems remain.
First, the defense is not clearly part of the criminal law of Germany and
other civil law jurisdictions. True, a number of theoretical accounts of
the criminal law in civil law jurisdictions by leading scholars support its
recognition. 38 And while it is claimed to enjoy a foundation in statutes
governing tort law, 39 it nonetheless has not been codified as part of the
criminal law. 40 Second, George Fletcher himself seems to have either
ignored or dismissed the defense.41 Third, this resolution of the issue
under the tripartite approach fails to harmonize the similar cases of
defensive force against psychotic and mistaken aggression. Although
both innocent victims face attacks by faultless aggressors, one victim is
eligible for the defense of self-defense and one victim is not. Justifying
one victim's force under self-defense and the other victim's force under
defensive necessity treats similar cases dissimilarly. And fourth, if the
resolution requires going so far afield as invoking the merely theoretical
defense of defensive necessity, the tripartite structure's claim of
superiority and conceptual elegance over the bipartite structure is
undermined. This is especially so since it is the tripartite structure's
placement of mens rea in the first stage that creates this very difficulty.
iii. Declaring Force Wrongful and Not Wrongful
Another possible resolution of the unfortunate outcome of the
victim's ineligibility for justified self-defense would be MA's not
wrongful conduct somehow being deemed wrongful. If MA's conduct
was wrongful then the victim would be eligible to be justified in using
self-defense force against MA. But since Mi's mistake was reasonable
and unavoidable, thereby negating the mental state element of the
38 Id. at 197 (noting that "'defensive necessity,' has found its way into the leading theoretical
literature on criminal law"). For a sampling of theoreticians discussing defensive necessity, see
id. at 199 n.l15.
39 GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 776-79 (1978) [hereinafter
FLETCHER, RETHINKING]; Byrd, supra note 37, at 197-99.
40 Though not formally part of the codified criminal law, Byrd notes that defensive necessity
"has become part of the leading theory in Germany." Byrd, supra note 37, at 199.
41 FLETCHER, RETHINKING, supra note 39, at 778 (criticizing defensive necessity for
deemphasizing the "criteria of responsibility"). Elsewhere in Fletcher's writings the defense of
defensive necessity is largely if not entirely ignored.
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offense, MA's conduct does not satisfy the definition of the offense and
thus, on this basis, cannot be wrongful. If MA's conduct was deemed
wrongful, MA would not be able to escape criminal liability because MA
lacks both a justification defense and an excuse defense. So if MA's
conduct was deemed wrongful, then MA would unfairly and
inappropriately be criminally liable.
Could MA's conduct remain non-wrongful for purposes of
assessing MA's criminal liability but be deemed wrongful for purposes
of assessing the justifiability of the victim's self-defense force?42 If so,
then MA would properly avoid criminal liability and the victim would
properly be allowed to use justified self-defense force against MA. This
would be a quite convenient resolution except for one possible
problem-wrongfulness would have two different meanings at one and
the same time.
Could such a definition be tolerated in the tripartite approach?
Consider Fletcher's following account:
[T]he German tripartite structure... represents a claim about the
way things are and about the inherent structure of criminal liability.
This is not simply a matter of opinion for how best to organize our
thinking about criminal liability. It is rather a claim about the world,
much as a scientific claim about the structure of atoms is an assertion
of truth about a physical phenomenon. 43
Is it really true that a single, particular instance of conduct being both
wrongful and non-wrongful at one and the same time is just "the way
things are?" Is this really an assertion of truth about the world-that
both X and not X obtain at the same time? Since such ambiguity-and
ad hoc ambiguity at that-is to be avoided in criminal theory, especially
for a structure which claims conceptual elegance and superiority, this
resolution is far from ideal. Fletcher's rhetorical questions posed to the
drafters of the Model Penal Code for their codifying that which is a
matter of philosophical truth would seem to apply to a tripartite
structure relying on such a conception of wrongfulness: "[If the earth] is
flat, will the King's command make it round? And if it is round, will
the King's command flatten it?"44
Even if an actor's force could be wrongful and not wrongful at the
same time under this version of the tripartite structure, this possible
resolution fails to solve all the problems. True, the resolution would
both allow an innocent victim to use justified self-defense against an
aggressor and harmonize the treatment of innocent victims facing
faultless aggression. But even so, this version of the tripartite structure
42 1 am grateful to George Fletcher for pointing out that this possible resolution was advanced
and considered by some German theoreticians.
43 George P. Fletcher, Truth in Codification, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 745, 756 (1998).
44 Id. at 745 (quoting ROBERT BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS 133 (1990)).
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would be treating similar cases dissimilarly. Even under this proposed
resolution, for purposes of assessing each aggressor's criminal liability,
PA's conduct is wrongful and MA's conduct is not wrongful. As a
result, even under this resolution, this version of the tripartite structure
treats similar cases dissimilarly.
2. Splitting Mens Rea Between the First and Third Stages
The analysis of the cases of faultless aggression under the tripartite
structure with mens rea entirely in the first stage does not change with
mens rea split between the first and third stages. The factual,
descriptive portion of mens rea-intention-would be a part of the
definition of the offense. But the mistaken aggressor's reasonable and
unavoidable mistake negates the inculpatory dimension of definition of
the offense and thus the conduct is not wrongful. As against this not
wrongful force, the victim is ineligible to justifiably use force in self-
defense. The psychotic aggressor's attack is wrongful, making the
victim eligible to justifiably use force in self-defense. As a result, the
twin problems stemming from analyzing mens rea in the first stage
reoccur when splitting mens rea between the first and third stages. This
version of the tripartite structure splitting mens rea would both (i) treat
the similar cases of faultless aggression dissimilarly, and (ii)
inappropriately bar an innocent victim of aggression from being eligible
to justifiably use force in self-defense.
3. Mens Rea Within the Third Stage-Culpability
Perhaps the above problems may be avoided by analyzing mens
rea within the third stage, the culpability stage. Again, in order to
determine whether the victim is eligible for a self-defense justification
for force used against MA, MA4's force must be wrongful. Since MA's
mens rea and mistake of fact is no longer analyzed in the first stage, the
presumptive determination that M satisfies the definition of the offense
may no longer be negated by MA's mistake of fact. This satisfaction of
the first stage generates a presumptive determination that M's conduct
is wrongful. Since M's wrongful conduct cannot be negated by a
justification defense, MA's conduct is wrongful. Since MA's conduct is
wrongful, the victim is eligible for a self-defense justification for using
force against MA's wrongful attack. This version of the tripartite
approach yields the correct result of the victim being eligible to
justifiably use force in self-defense against MA.
And this version of the tripartite approach harmonizes the
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treatment of the faultless aggression cases. Both the reasonably and
unavoidably mistaken aggressor's conduct and the psychotic
aggressor's conduct are wrongful. Therefore, both victims of faultless
aggression are eligible to be justified in self-defense.
Although this version of the tripartite structure that places the
actor's mens rea in the third stage avoids the difficulties incurred by
treating the actor's mens rea as part of the first stage, it nonetheless
incurs difficulties as applied to another issue.
B. Attempt Offenses
1. Mens Rea Within the Third Stage
One consequence of placing the analysis of mens rea in the third
stage, the culpability stage, is a comparatively minimalistic definition of
the elements of the offense. With the issue of mens rea removed to the
third stage, the remaining components comprising the elements of the
offense stage are the actor's voluntary act or omission as well as the
possible elements of a prohibited result and causation. Additionally,
some offenses might include attendant circumstances such as the
presence of night (in a burglary offense) or the age of the victim (in
statutory rape) as elements.
With mens rea removed, does such a minimalist definition of the
elements of the offense describe conduct that may plausibly be
understood as wrongful and criminal? Presumably yes, at least for
some offenses. Consider, for example, a homicide. The definitional
elements would include (i) a voluntary act or omission (ii) that caused
(iii) the prohibited result of a dead human being. These elements seem
to comprise a plausible description of conduct that could intelligibly be
declared as a criminal offense and wrongful.
The more minimalistic definitions of inchoate offenses, however,
pose a challenge to this version of the tripartite approach. Since the
elements of a prohibited result and causation are inapplicable in an
attempt offense, the definition of the elements of the offense may be as
minimal as a single element-a voluntary act or omission. Is a single
element sufficient to plausibly describe a criminal offense?
Consider Glanville Williams' example of an actor pausing before a
haystack and lighting a match. 45 If we know that the actor's intent is to
set fire to the haystack in order to burn the barn, the actor's conduct is
clearly sufficiently close to consummating arson to count as attempted
45 GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART 630 (2d ed. 1961).
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arson.46 But that is if we know the actor's intent. The actor's intent
might equally be to light a pipe. And then obviously the actor is neither
criminally liable for attempted arson nor any crime. Williams' point is
that for some attempts, the mens rea is the essence of the offense. 47 It is
the mens rea of intent to commit arson which makes the act of lighting a
match before a haystack a plausibly criminal act.48
Similarly, the essence of many impossible attempts is the intent to
commit the crime.49 Without knowledge of the intent of the actor,
innocuous acts like putting sugar into another's coffee hardly seem to
plausibly and intelligibly describe a criminal offense or wrongful
conduct.
By separating an actor's voluntary act or omission from his mens
rea, this version of the tripartite approach is implausible for attempt
offenses. Merely innocuous and lawful acts like lighting a match or
putting sugar into another's coffee satisfy the definitions of the offenses
of attempted arson and attempted murder, respectively. In addition,
such innocuous and lawful acts would satisfy the inculpatory dimension
of the second stage and be declared presumptively wrongful. While no
doubt such acts are wrongful if coupled with the intent to commit the
crime, it is difficult to conceive of them as wrongful in isolation from
their actor's mens rea. Fletcher maintains that "a criminal intent, acted
out in an 'objectively innocent' way, should not be enough." 50 If so,
then a fortiori an objectively innocent act alone (without criminal
intent) should not be sufficient to generate a presumption of
wrongfulness.
Fletcher explains that "[t]he minimal demand on the definition of
an offense is that it reflect a morally coherent norm in a given society at
a given time."' 5' Fletcher considers the offense of reckless driving:
46 Id.
47 Id. at 631 ("[John] Austin put forward the interesting view that in attempt the party is really
punished for his intention, the act being required as evidence of a firm intention. There is much
to be said for this.").
48 Id. at 630.
49 See FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS, supra note 26, at 178 (noting that the subjectivist view
of attempts places "[t]he emphasis on intention as the core of the crime"). In contrast, under the
objectivist theory of attempts, the focus is on the conduct itself and that the conduct must
manifest danger. Id. at 177; George P. Fletcher, Constructing a Theory of Impossible Attempts, 5
CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 53, 55 (1986) [hereinafter Fletcher, Impossible Attempts] (explaining that
under the objectivist view, "criminal liability should require an act that, in some sense, is
objectively criminal"). Although Fletcher himself would favor an objectivist view of attempts, he
acknowledges that the subjectivist view prevails. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS, supra note 26, at
181 (lamenting "the subjectivist bias now dominant in German and American law"). And, as a
result, a tripartite structure would need to be compatible with the subjectivist view.
50 Fletcher, Impossible Attempts, supra note 49, at 55.
51 FLETCHER, RETHINKING, supra note 39, at 567; id. at 575 ("The contours of the definition
are set by the prohibitory norm. The prohibitory norm, in turn, must be cast so as to state a
morally coherent imperative in the particular society.").
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Logically, one could claim that the norm was directed against all
driving.... [However,] if recklessness were an element of the
definition, non-reckless or safe driving would not violate the
norm..... In our society, under normal circumstances, it would be
incoherent to prohibit driving altogether. No one would know what
to make of the norm. The only morally coherent norm would be one
that prohibited reckless driving. It follows that "recklessly" is an
element of the definition. 52
Apparently, under Fletcher's analysis, when the definition of an offense
would reflect a morally incoherent prohibitory norm without a mens rea
element, the mens rea element must be part of the definition. As a
result, at least with respect to the offense of reckless driving, the mens
rea cannot be placed in the third stage. 53 The definition of attempt
offenses would similarly reflect a morally incoherent norm, at least in
some cases, without a mens rea element. As a result, placing mens rea
in the third stage results in a definition of the offense that fails to meet
Fletcher's minimum condition for the definition of an offense-that it
reflect a morally coherent prohibitory norm.
Just as Fletcher explains that the mens rea element of recklessness
must be part of the definition of the offense of reckless driving, so also
intent to kill (or some mens rea element) must be part of the definition
of attempted murder. To see why, compare two actors who each put
sugar into the coffee of another. Kim Killer, with the intent to kill, puts
what she believes is poison, but is actually sugar, into another's coffee.
Under the tripartite structure placing mens rea in the third stage, Killer
satisfies the definition of the offense merely by the act of putting sugar
into another's coffee. Since Killer has no justification and no excuse,
Killer will be criminally liable for attempted murder. Sam Sweetener
puts sugar into his companion's coffee with the intent to make his
companion's coffee taste better. By committing the same act as Killer
(putting sugar into another's coffee), Sweetener, no less than Killer,
satisfies the definition of the offense of attempted murder. As a result,
Sweetener's conduct is presumptively wrongful and, by lacking a
justification, wrongful. It will not be until the third stage that
Sweetener's lack of intent to kill will negate culpability and preclude
criminal liability. Therefore, under this version of the tripartite
approach, thousands of innocent, law-abiding, loving couples are
committing wrongful conduct and satisfying the definitional elements of
the offense of attempted murder every morning over breakfast.
52 Id. at 567.
53 See supra text accompanying note 46.
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2. Mens Rea Within the First Stage
Perhaps to avoid the unfortunate and counter-intuitive results
discussed above, the tripartite structure should place mens rea in the
first stage. Under that version, the definition of the offense would
plausibly and intelligibly describe a criminal offense and wrongful
conduct. The definition of the offense of attempt would reflect a
morally coherent norm. The conduct of the actor lighting a match
before a haystack would only be found to satisfy the definition of the
offense of attempted arson and be engaging in wrongfulness if she had
the intent to commit arson. And Sam Sweetener, lacking the intent to
kill, would neither be found to have satisfied the definition of the
offense of attempted murder nor have engaged in wrongful conduct.
3. Splitting Mens Rea Between the First and Third Stages
The version of the tripartite structure splitting mens rea between
the first and third stages similarly avoids the problems incurred by
placing mens rea in the third stage when the tripartite structure is
applied to attempts. The factual, descriptive portion of the mens rea of
attempt-intention-would be part of the definition of the offense. As
a result, the conduct satisfying the definition of the offense would be
more than an innocuous act and would thereby reflect a morally
coherent norm.
C. Assessing Tripartite and Bipartite Structures
1. Each Version of the Tripartite Structure Avoids One Problem but
Incurs Another Problem
Each of the three versions of the tripartite structure is problematic.
Placing mens rea either in the first stage or splitting mens rea between
the first and third stages incurs difficulties with analyzing defensive
force against faultless aggressors. Both versions treat the similar cases
of the psychotic and mistaken aggressors dissimilarly and incorrectly
bar an innocent victim of aggression from eligibility for justified
defensive force. Placing mens rea in the third stage avoids these
difficulties, but incurs a problem as applied to attempt offenses.
Innocuous and lawful conduct satisfies the definition of the offense.
The definition of attempt offenses fails to meet the minimum requisite
condition-reflecting a morally coherent norm. The tripartite structure
may avoid this problem by either placing mens rea in the first stage or
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splitting mens rea between the first and third stages. But this brings us
back full circle. No single version of the tripartite structure
satisfactorily analyzes the issues of both faultless aggression and
attempts.
2. Bipartite Structure Avoids the Problems of Tripartite Structure
The bipartite structure avoids the problems besetting the various
versions of the tripartite structure. Applying the bipartite structure to
the faultless aggressor issue, the innocent victim, by intentionally using
force against MA and/or PA, satisfies the definition of the elements of
some crime of force-assault, battery, or attempted murder. The victim
commits a prohibited actus reus with the requisite mens rea. Under
Anglo-American law, the victim is eligible for the justification defense
of self-defense if he honestly and reasonably believed that MA's and/or
PA's force posed an unlawful threat.54 Unlike the versions of the
tripartite structure placing mens rea either partially or completely in the
first stage, the bipartite structure both (i) renders the victim eligible to
be justified in self-defense against the mistaken aggressor, and (ii) treats
the similar cases of faultless aggression similarly.
Let us now analyze attempt offenses under the bipartite structure.
The actor who lights a match before a haystack or puts sugar into
another's coffee, based on his actions alone with no consideration of his
mens rea, fails to satisfy the elements of an offense. But if the same
conduct is coupled with the requisite intent, the actor does satisfy the
elements of the offenses of attempted arson or attempted murder,
respectively. Unlike the tripartite structure, which places the issue of
mens rea in the third stage, the bipartite structure appropriately only
treats a union of the actus reus and mens rea as satisfying the elements
of a criminal offense and as conduct deserving the appellation
"wrongful."
Neither version of the tripartite structure satisfactorily analyzes
both issues of defensive force against faultless aggressors and attempt
offenses. In contrast, the bipartite structure satisfactorily analyzes both
issues. Of course, merely the comparative analysis of these two issues
is an insufficient basis upon which to claim that one structure of
criminal law is superior to another. That the bipartite structure seems
preferable on these two narrow bases may be sufficient, however, to
cast some doubt on the broadly claimed superiority of the tripartite
structure.




Versions of the tripartite structure differ as to whether mens rea
belongs in the first stage (definition of the offense), in the third stage
(culpability), or split between the first and third stages. Two possible
interpretations are considered, but found unsatisfactory. First, all three
versions of the tripartite structure are correct and preferable to the
bipartite structure. This interpretation is problematic by generating a
contradiction that an actor's degree of wrongdoing is simultaneously
greater than, the same as, and less than another actor's conduct. The
other possible interpretation is that only one of the versions of the
tripartite structure is correct and preferable to the bipartite structure.
This interpretation is also problematic. By placing mens rea either
partially or completely within the first stage, similar cases of faultless
aggression are treated dissimilarly and innocent victims are barred from
eligibility for justified defensive force against mistaken aggressors.
And by placing mens rea in the third stage, the resulting minimalist
definition of the elements of attempt offenses fails to reflect a morally
coherent norm. Thus, each of the three versions of the tripartite
structure is unsatisfactory. The difficulties in analyzing mens rea render
the claimed superiority of the tripartite structure unclear.
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